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ABSTRACT
Steganography is the art and science of hiding information within information
so that an observer does not know that communication is taking place. Bad
actors passing information using steganography are of concern to the national
security establishment and law enforcement. An attempt was made to
determine if steganography was being used by criminals to communicate
information. Web crawling technology was used and images were downloaded
from Web sites that were considered as likely candidates for containing
information hidden using steganographic techniques. A detection tool was used
to analyze these images. The research failed to demonstrate that steganography
was prevalent on the public Internet. The probable reasons included the growth
and availability of large number of steganography-producing tools and the
limited capacity of the detection tools to cope with them. Thus, a redirection
was introduced in the methodology and the detection focus was shifted from
the analysis of the ‘product’ of the steganography-producing software; viz. the
images, to the 'artifacts’ left by the steganography-producing software while it
is being used to generate steganographic images. This approach was based on
the concept of ‘Stego-Usage Timeline’. As a proof of concept, a sample set of
criminal computers was scanned for the remnants of steganography-producing
software. The results demonstrated that the problem of ‘the detection of the
usage of steganography’ could be addressed by the approach adopted after the
research redirection and that certain steganographic software was popular
among the criminals. Thus, the contribution of the research was in
demonstrating that the limitations of the tools based on the signature detection
of steganographically altered images can be overcome by focusing the
detection effort on detecting the artifacts of the steganography-producing tools.
Keywords: steganography, signature detection, file artifact detection.
1. INTRODUCTION TO STEGANOGRAPHY
The term steganography is derived from the Greek words steganos, which
means ‘covered’, and graphein, which means ‘to write’ (Singh, 1999).
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Steganography is the art and science of hiding information. The term
steganography can also be used to refer to the hidden information itself.
Steganography facilitates secret, undetected communication and refers to
hiding information in information (Katzenbeisser and Petitcolas, 2000).
1.1. Steganographic Techniques
Steganography can be hidden within numerous types of files, most commonly
image files. The images in which the secret information is hidden are called
carrier files or cover images. The resultant files which contain the hidden
information are referred to as stegoed files. Various techniques of
steganography include LSB (least significant bit) steganography (Wayner,
2002), manipulation of the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) function
(Acharya and Tsai, 2005), and the append technique (Goudy, 2007). The
algorithms which are used for hiding information in the carrier files use
different techniques to hide information in different types of files. These
algorithms act in known and predictable ways. The embedding action of the
algorithms often leaves image artifacts in the cover images ("Stego Suite,"
2006).
The artifacts discussed in the first research project are specific only to the
images. The term ‘file artifact’ is used to refer to the evidence left by the
steganography-producing software application on the host system that
generated the stegoed files and is discussed in the second research project.
Image artifacts are observable anomalies in various characteristics of the image
which indicate action of steganographic embedding software. Artifacts consist
of changes to associated information and are not necessarily detectable by
analyzing only the pixilated composition of the image (Wayner, 2002).
Embedding applications employ these steganographic algorithms in various
ways and to varying degrees of effectiveness and stealth (Wayner, 2002). Some
applications leave signatures, in the images in which they have hidden
information. Signatures are means of associating the image with a specific
steganographic application in order to identify which steganographic
application must be employed for image extraction. Signatures are also
detectable by steganalytic software. A detected signature almost always
indicates the presence of steganography ("StegAlyzerSS," 2006). Shorter
signatures are more likely to be present in non-stegoed images by random
chance, thereby producing false positives in signature-based detection
software.
1.2 Detection
Various techniques are employed to detect the presence of steganography.
Many detection applications are written to detect steganography based on the
knowledge of the steganographic application which embedded the information.
These are signature-based detection schemes (Jackson, Gunsch, Claypoole, and
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Lamont, 2003). A signature-based detection scheme uses knowledge of the
signatures to identify suspect images. A steganographic embedding application
implements an embedding algorithm. The application may leave a signature,
however the algorithm may create one or more image artifacts. These artifacts
can then be detected in the image regardless of the application which employed
the method that the algorithm is written to implement ("Stego Suite," 2006).
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH
The question of concern is whether steganography is being used by criminals?
The research targets the population of steganography users with a criminal
background (represented by the shaded area in figure 1). The usage of
steganography may or may not be made for committing or providing assistance
to crime. As shown in figure 2, the research consisted of two projects. The first
project consisted of the detection of the presence of steganography in carrier
images found on the Web and the second project consisted of detecting if
steganographic applications had been installed (and/or used) and whether they
left behind file artifacts on computers that were seized during criminal
investigations of various types.

Criminals
Research Question:
Is steganography being
used by criminals (and to
what extent)?

Users of Steganography
Steganography
used for criminal
purposes

Figure 1: Target population of the Research
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Research
Project I

Research
Project II

Data Source

Internet Web sites provided
by National White Collar
Crime Center (NW3C) and the
Indiana State Police

Computers seized by Indiana
State Police and Chicago Police
Department in relation to
criminal activities

Data Collection and Analysis

Web Survey

Scanning

Web Crawler

Images

StegAlyzerSS

Interpretation of
Research Question

StegAlyzerAS

File Artifacts

Signature
Analysis

False
Positive
Analysis

NIST Steganography
Database: Automated
Search and Manual Scan

Was steganographyproducing software
installed on these
computers?

Was information
embedded in these
images using
steganographyproducing software?

Figure 2: Overview of the Research
2.1. Research Project I: Signature Detection in Carrier Images
This study attempted to determine to what extent steganography may have
been used by criminals to communicate information over the Web. This project
made the use of the signature (image artifact) detection technique explained in
Section 1.
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2.1.1. Motivation
Digital steganography represents a particularly significant threat today because
of the large number of applications freely available on the Internet that are easy
to find, download, install, and use to steal sensitive, classified, or proprietary
information and conceal evidence of other types of criminal activity (Backbone
Security). On the Web, there is evidence of terrorists using steganography to
communicate covertly. “…individuals can use steganography…to embed
messages into digital photographs or music clips. Posted on publicly available
Web sites, the photos or clips are downloaded by collaborators as necessary.
(This technique was reportedly used by recently arrested terrorists when they
planned to blow up the US Embassy in Paris)” (Homer-Dixon, 2002, p. 54;
Kolata, 2001). Terrorists would want to hide information in images which are
posted to high traffic sites which have high turnover rates of images (Davidson
and Goutam, 2004). Thus, steganography has the potential for harmful and
dangerous applications.
2.1.2. Steganographic Web Survey
An attempt to determine the prevalence of steganography in carrier images on
the Web was made by the research team in conjunction with Backbone
Security, Inc. and law enforcement.
2.1.3. Comparison with related Prior Work: Survey conducted by
University of Michigan
The research project described in this paper is distinct from the Web survey
conducted by Neils Provos of University of Michigan in 2001. The latter used
the tool Stegdetect to analyze over two million images from downloaded only
from eBay auction sites. It was a survey of JPEG images only. The University
of Michigan concluded that there was no steganography on the Web (Provos
and Honeyman, 2002). Provos’ survey used signature-based detection tools to
detect the possible embedding of steganography only by three possible tools
while as this research addresses as many as 16 information hiding tools.
2.1.4. Tools and Validation
The signature-based detection software selected for the survey proposed in this
paper was StegAlyzerSS, version 1.1, named StegScan 1.1. The version of the
software used to test the suspect images was ported to ANSI C from the
proprietary version, and run under Debian LINUX. The version 2.0 of this
software was rated effective by the Defense Cyber Crime Institute (DCCI) in
tests conducted during October 2006. The tests conducted by the DCCI
indicated the Backbone software was able to identify steganography from
fourteen different algorithms with 99.6% certainty that steganography existed
when an image was detected as containing steganography (Hirsh and Kong,
2006). The Backbone StegAlyzerSS was able to identify steganography
embedded by the applications listed in table 1 (CyberScience Laboratory
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Functional Analysis of StegAlyzerSS Version 1.1, 2005).
Table 1: List of Detectable Signatures
Steganography Embedding Program
CryptArkan 1.0

InPlain View 1.0

wbStego 4.2

wbStego 2.0

JPegX 1.00.6

Camouflage 1.0.4

Camouflage 1.1.2

Camouflage 1.2.1

Cloak 7.0

Data Stash 1.1

Data Stash 1.1b

Data Stealth 1.0

Hiderman

Safe and Quick 2002

Steganography 1.50

Steganography 1.61

2.1.5. Added Software Functionality
While the StegalyzerSS product was used as the processing engine to analyze
the Web-based images, that engine needed to be embedded within a larger
system capable of crawling the Web in search of those images. The following
additional functionality was developed:


Added capability to run on multiple processing nodes that then
aggregated their findings onto a single master node.



Utilized MD5 hashing to prevent the downloading and analysis of
duplicate pages (i.e. the same image file on multiple pages)



Utilized concept of worksets where a workset is a single URL to be
used as a starting point for crawling. All crawling was limited to the
Internet domain that the initial URL belongs to.



Recorded all downloaded files for option of re-analysis later with
additional signatures.
2.1.6. Equipment

Web crawling technology was used to find and download images by the
research team. The survey was conducted with a variable number of machines
as seen in the table 2. One database server was always on line. This database
server was the supervisor, and passed each next URL to the crawling nodes
(machines which performed the HTTP requests).
Table 2: Crawling Node Force Deployment
Date

Crawling Nodes

3/31/2007

2

4/24/2007

3

6/19/2007

5
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The database and file server computer was a Dell Optiplex GX280 Pentium 4
at 2.8GHz with 1 GB of RAM. The crawling nodes were Pentium IIIs running
at 667 MHz with 512MB RAM. The connection to the Internet was made
through a fiber optic connection. The overall system layout of the survey is
illustrated in figure 3.

Figure 3: Web Crawler System Diagram
2.1.7. Data Gathering and Analysis
The survey was conducted by crawling selected base URLs recursively until
there were no more links in the domain of the base URL to visit. Sites that had
URLs different than specified base URLs were not visited. The base URLs of
the sites that were surveyed were provided by parties interested in the results of
the research as it pertained to their areas of responsibility. These organizations
included the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) and the Indiana
State Police. Heavily trafficked foreign sites figured prominently in the list of
sites crawled for steganography. The total also included sites which had less
than ten URLs searched. As seen in table 3, the number in parentheses
indicates the number of base URLs in the grouping. The total is the total for all
of the sites crawled with that grouping of completed URLs.
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Table 3: Number of Completed URLs
Base URL Groupings

Completed URLs

A (4) - 10-100 URLs

205

B (6) - 101-1,000 URLs

2,912

C (2) - 1,001-10,000URLs

5,599

D (4) - 10,001 - 100,000 URLs

189,014

E (3) - 100,001 +

1,221,380

Total (sites with < 10 completed URLs)

1,419,114

The crawler application started at the base URL and crawled through all the
links from each page to the maximum possible depth from the base URL. All
of the items which were contained in a HREF= or IMG SRC= tag in the page
source were downloaded, cataloged and then analyzed. The base URL was
never traveled away from in the search, i.e., when a link specified a site with a
different base URL, that link was not followed. The first recorded result was
time-stamped 03/31/2006 at 1552hrs (local, Eastern time) and the final result
was recorded on 06/30/2006 at 0444hrs.The image file types discovered in the
survey are summarized in table 4.
Table 4: Image File Types Discovered in Survey File
Extension

Number Found

BMP

9

GIF

8,544

JPG

67,414

PNG

64

TIFF

7

X-3DS

7

These images were gathered and analyzed with the help of StegAlyzerSS
application. No carrier images were found to contain steganographic
signatures. Thus, the project failed to answer the research questions presented
in figure 1 and figure 2.
2.1.8. Intermediate Conclusion
The Web crawling survey and signature detection did not find any conclusive
evidence that steganography is being used on the Web. There are several
possible explanations for this:
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There is no steganography in images on the Web



The sample size was too small



There was steganography, however it was not hidden in the file
formats that the detection software was able to detect against, or



There was steganography in the surveyed images; however it was not
hidden using the algorithms the detection software was aware of.

2.1.9. Research Redirection
The detection problem in steganography is multivariate. There are over 825
embedding applications which have been available for download from the
Internet at various times (J. Goldman, personal communication, May 16,
2007). This number is to be compared to the number of signatures which image
analysis software is currently capable of detecting, which is in the
neighborhood of 25-35. Not all of these signatures can be detected by a single
steganography detection application.
The most likely explanation for the steganography not being detected in the
Research Project I is that the steganography used and posted on the public
Internet uses hiding techniques and hiding applications which were not being
tested by the StegAlyzerSS detection application.
There are many steganography-producing applications that could possibly be
used and it is impractical to write signature detection algorithms for all of
them. For this reason, some prioritization of effort in developing signature
based detection methods must be achieved. To do so there must be a sense of
which applications the users of steganography are employing. To study this
concept, the following “Stego-Usage Timeline” (table 5) was formed.
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Steganographic activity of the criminals

Install
steganography
-producing
software

Generate
hidden
message
(optional
encryption)

Download and
Extract hidden
message
(optional
decryption)

Post
stegoed
images on
the Web

Delete
posted
stegoed
image from
the Web

Uninstall
steganography
- producing
software

Stego
Timeline

Evidence

File
artifacts on
the host
system may
remain

Carrier files that have
been stegoed often
contain signatures (image
artifacts)

Steganography‐
producing software
often leaves file
artifacts on the host
system

Investigation Activity

Research Project

Research Project

Examine and detect file
artifacts: Examine
suspect computer for
evidence of installed
(and potentially
removed)
steganographyproducing applications

Detect stegoed image
files: Specialized
detection software can
spot signatures on
carrier files. Other
detection software
performs statistical
analysis at the bit level

Figure 4: The Stego-Usage Timeline
In order to produce a hidden message, steganographic software must be
acquired and installed. This creates file artifacts on the host system. The file
artifacts can take the form of changed registry entries, temporary files,
directories created, and shortcuts on the desktop. Stegoed files are then
generated. This involves selecting cover data, selecting the message and then
embedding the message. These files would presumably be one time use files,
and would be deleted at the conclusion of sending the files. The deletion of the
data would, if not done securely, also leave evidence on the host machine.
Specifically, standard forensic analysis would reveal these files. If the user did
not delete the files in any way at the conclusion of the use of the steganography
application, these files would provide images for comparison of cover images
and provide an easier attack to extract the steganography. At the time the
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stegoed file is transmitted or posted, it could be observed over the
communications channel. It would also be theoretically possible to run
detection techniques against all of the data observed during transmission.
Once the suspect files have been detected, further analysis is performed.
Knowing the specific steganography- producing application which hid the
information would allow for possible extraction. If the message is extracted,
then there may be a decryption step if the information was encrypted before it
was embedded and sent. The user of the steganography software would then
potentially uninstall the software perhaps thinking naively that no trace of his
or her activity existed. In fact, because the vast majority of these applications
are written with less than professional production values, the artifacts of the
existence of that software would still be present on the host system and would
be detectable if proper detection methods were used. Artifact detection would
be the final step. This step requires the forensic examiner to have access to the
host machine and is able to analyze it with the proper software.
Thus, a research redirection from Project I to Project II was introduced in order
to address the research question as shown in figure 5. The research was carried
out in two subsequent phases where Project II followed Project I and in which
the approach taken for addressing the research question was modified based on
the conclusions presented in 2.1.8 and the fact that the Project I failed to
establish that steganography was used by criminals. Thus, Research Project I
provides context for Research Project II. The redirection was based on the
concept of ‘Stego-Usage Timeline’ presented in figure 4. As explained above,
steganography-generation process involves many phases and while the time
when the signature-based method (as demonstrated in Research Project I) can
be used for detection is later in the timeline, the host-file detection method
(demonstrated in Research Project II) allows us to traverse back to the earlier
stages of steganography-generation and its detection is applicable over a larger
span (dotted line in figure 4 marks the end of this span) of the Stego-Usage
timeline as compared to that of the former.
Thus, the redirection consists of a focus shift from the analysis of the ‘product’
of the steganography-producing software; viz. the images, to the ‘evidence’ left
by the steganography-producing software while they are being used to generate
steganographic images.
Is steganography being used by criminals (and to what extent)?

Research
Project I

Research Redirection

Figure 5: Research Redirection
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2.2. Research Project II: File Artifact Detection on Criminal Computers
The second phase of the research consisted of scanning computers seized by
law enforcement agencies for steganographic file artifacts.
2.2.1. Motivation
A tool which can detect steganographic file artifacts can be used on suspects’
machines to determine if certain steganography-producing software was ever
present or used and what it may have been. With positive results regarding the
use of steganography software on machines seized by law enforcement or the
national security apparatus, a sense of which steganography-producing
software is popular with which criminal elements can be gained, thereby
allowing research in signature detection to be focused in that direction.
It would be useful to require that all imaged hard drives booked into evidence
and examined should be examined for host system artifacts with a file artifact
detection application. It is critical for efficient use of law enforcement and
national security resources to know which applications are being used by
criminal and terrorist suspects. With the knowledge of which steganographyproducing software is in use, based on evidence provided from seized
computers which exhibit artifacts of that particular steganography software,
there will be a more structured focus possible in terms of writing signature
based detection tools. These tools would detect against the signatures of
steganography-producing applications found to be favored by the groups which
are of interest. Thus, a research focus shift to host system artifact detection was
indicated by the Stego-Usage Timeline.
2.2.2. Tools and Validation
The product used for performing detection of the steganographic file artifacts
was Backbone Security’s StegAlyzerAS version 2.1. This software tool enables
the investigators to detect the presence of steganography-producing programs
as well as the remnants of such programs within a computer’s file and registry.
The program enables the user to search files, directories, entire drives, and
forensic images to locate evidence of data hiding activity on a disk. The
program is capable of mounting forensic images in the following formats:
EnCase RAW (dd), ISO, and SMART. StegAlyzerAS includes case
management features to log all actions performed during an investigation,
record detailed information about each case, and manage collected evidence.
The application generates reports in HTML format (CyberScience Laboratory,
2008). Version 2.1 of StegAlyzerAS can detect all the file and Windows
Registry artifacts associated with 625 digital steganography and information
hiding tools (Backbone Security). StegAlyzerAS allows the search of the files
by using hash values such as MD5 and SHA-256 which are stored in the
Steganography Application Fingerprint Database (SAFDB) and registry entries
stored in the Registry Artifact Key Database (RAKDB) distributed with
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StegAlyzerAS (Backbone Security).
This host artifact detection tool was tested for performance by conducting a
study of a test machine on which a variety of steganographic software was
installed and deleted or uninstalled. StegAlyzerAS was able to detect that all of
those steganography-producing programs were once installed on the test
machine. Also, StegAlyzerAS was found to be effective for identifying file and
registry artifacts by the Defense Cyber Crime Institute (DCCI) and the
CyberScience Laboratory (CSL) (Backbone Security).
2.2.3. Data Collection Process
The product along with its usage instructions was sent to Chicago Police
Department (CPD) which scanned the criminal computer disks with the help of
StegAlyzerAS. A member of the research team was allowed to carry out the
scans of the criminal computers for a day at the CPD. The research team also
scanned images provided by the Indiana State Police. The tool was run against
the disk images of total 96 computer drives from seized computers and each
one was known as a case. This formed the sample set which corresponded to
the population of users of steganography with criminal background (n=96).
2.2.4. Data Processing and Analysis
The information from the generated HTML files was extracted into a MS
Access database (2002- 2003 format) which consisted the following for each
case:


Description of the case: This consisted of details regarding the seized
computer, crime associated with it, agency handling the case and
criminal details



Results obtained after scanning the respective drive: This consisted of
information about the artifacts found in the report of each case, the
corresponding steganography-producing application which generated
it, the location of the artifact and its MD5 hash value.
2.2.5. False Positive Analysis

A large number of artifacts were flagged as likely steganography-producing
software artifacts. But these artifacts may or may not have been the indicators
that steganographic tools were installed on that machine because certain
artifacts that are left behind by the steganography-producing applications can
also be left by common and harmless applications; e.g. unwise.exe is a
common artifact found bundled with the Wise installer package. Although,
StegalyzerAS flags it to be associated with steganography-producing software,
a particular instance of the artifact may be left behind by software like MS
Word since unwise.exe is used by non-steganographic software too. Therefore,
the entire artifact list obtained in the scan results had to be subjected to a false
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positive analysis.
In order to ensure that a particular artifact was specific to a steganographic
application the following false positive treatment was devised. The NIST
National Software Reference Library database (NSRL) consists of MD5 hash
values of file artifacts left by known, traceable software applications and it also
lists the type of application it is. The NIST database was broken down into 3
different classes as follows:
Table 5: NIST Database Artifact Classification
Class 1

Class 2

Class 3

Consisted of MD5 hash
values of artifacts
which belonged only to
the non-steganographic
applications

Consisted of MD5 hash
values of artifacts
which belonged only to
the steganographic
applications

Consisted of MD5 hash
values of artifacts which
were common to both
the steganographic as
well as the nonsteganographic
applications.

The false positive analysis was carried out by assigning a value to each
(artifact, corresponding steganography-producing application) pair based on
the comparison of its hash value with those in the NSRL database and
depending on the class under which it fell. The values were assigned from the
following set:
Table 6: Results Artifact Classification
NS

PS

ID

NF

MS

Not Steganography,
if the artifact was
found in the Class 1

Positive
Steganography,
if it was found
only in Class 2

Indeterminate,
if it was found
in Class 3

Not Found, if it was
not found in either of
the classes of table 5,
so it is not known
whether the artifact is
steganographic or
not.

Manual Scan: The
pairs flagged with
the value NF were
checked manually
for their location
where the artifacts
were found and
depending on
intelligent human
judgment, they
were flagged as
MS if the path or
pathnames showed
any indication of
the artifact being
in steganography
related folders.
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2.2.6. Results and Analysis
The artifacts and applications were then subjected to analysis as per the value
taken by the false positive flag. The obtained results and their implications are
enlisted as below:


The term ‘interesting items’ refers to the entries flagged with a ‘PS’ or
a ‘NF’ value because it indicates that either the (application, artifact)
pair is confirmed as steganography or it cannot be eliminated as a nonsteganographic instance respectively.



The total of the 96 cases had 4708 (application, artifact) pairs and not
all of them were unique. In terms of artifacts, only 62 unique artifact
names were found where 11 of them appeared only once. The
remaining 51 artifact names accounted for 928 of the 939 total
interesting items (98.8%). Thus, a large number of duplicates was
found in the (application, artifact) pairs.



Manual scan results depended on the intelligent judgment of the
human who was conducting it. As seen in table 7, in spite of going
through the paths of each and every (application, artifact) pair, it was
not possible to conclude in any case that an artifact was definitively
steganographic in nature from its path name and the location of the
folder on the seized criminal computer. Thus, the manual scan failed
to produce any positive results for this dataset (MS=0).

The number of occurrences for each of the flag values in the order of its
decreasing importance is specified in table 7.
Table 7: Analysis of flag occurrence counts

Serial
Flag
Number

Occurrence
(Total 4708)

Percentage of
Occurrence
(rounded)
(%)

1

PS (Interesting
Items)

12

0.2549

2

MS

0

0.0000

3

NF(Interesting
Items)

927

19.6899

4

ID

1785

37.9142

5

NS

1984

42.1410

19

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 4(2)



It can be observed that there is 42.1410 % of confirmed nonsteganographic data which means that in the best possible case there
can be 57.8590% of steganography (if all the NF and ID flags were
indeed positive in terms of steganography) out of which this research
was able to prove and confirm 0.2549%. The other tools that
StegAlyzerSS was capable of detecting were either not popular among
the criminals or their corresponding artifacts were categorized as NF
or ID. And thus the possibility of the usage of those applications by
criminals cannot be eliminated.



Twelve Positive Steganography flags were found. They were
distributed over four cases respectively. Table 8 provides the details
regarding these findings. It can be seen that the results generated by
StegAlyzerAS and the false positive treatment confirmed the use of
four different applications for generating steganography; viz. Gif-ItUp, OutGuess, MP3StegoEncoder and wbStego. If these applications
are compared with those mentioned in table 1 it is observed that the
signature detection tool StegAlyzerSS was only capable of scanning
the criminal computers for 16 programs and out of which only one;
namely wbStego was used by the criminals and also the version used
was different. Thus table 8 demonstrates that steganography had been
used by criminals of varied backgrounds and that certain
steganographic tools are likely to be popular among criminals that the
signature detection tools were not capable of recognizing.
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Table 8: Positive Steganography Flag details
Case
Number

Number
of PS
Flags

Crime
Type

Application Name

Artifact Name

1

8

Attempted
Homicide

wbStego99 v3.51

_ISREG32.DLL

wbStego99 v3.5

_ISREG32.DLL

wbStego99 v3.1

_ISREG32.DLL

wbStego v4.2

_ISREG32.DLL

wbStego v4.0

_ISREG32.DLL
*

MP3StegoEncoder v1.1.15
(Linux)

Huffdec

MP3StegoEncoder v1.1.15
(Linux)

Dewindow

wbStego v4.1

_ISREG32.DLL

Fraud on a
Financial
Institution

MP3StegoEncoder v1.1.15
(Linux)

Dewindow

MP3StegoEncoder v1.1.15
(Linux)

Huffdec

2

2

3

1

Unknown

OutGuess v0.2 (Linux)

install-sh

4

1

Child Porn

Gif-It-Up v1.0

_ISREG32.DLL
*

*Although the commonality of the artifact is observed over different steganographyproducing applications, the aim of the flag classification is indicating the presence of
positive steganography and not establishing a unique correlation between an artifact
and an application



These results can also contribute in formulating efficient signature
detection approach by providing input in the form of a list of popular
steganography-producing programs. This is done by introducing
prioritization in the process of signature detection as shown in figure
6. As explained in section 2.1.9, the detection software faces
limitations in terms of the number of signatures it is capable of
detecting. This is because the number of existing steganographyproducing applications is too large to be incorporated into the
detection engine and it keeps growing over time. For instance, from
the feedback of the analysis provided by table 8, the detection tool
should incorporate the capability for detecting the steganographyproducing tools found in file artifact scanning; namely Gif-It-Up,
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OutGuess, MP3StegoEncoder and the specific versions of wbStego
mentioned in the table 8, i.e. it should be aware of the algorithms used
by these applications. The applications which are associated with NF
and ID flags and which occur over and over again can also be
incorporated in the signature detection tool. Since a large number of
(artifact, application) duplicate pairs were found in this case, it
becomes easier to choose the applications for prioritization.
Research
Project I

Research
Project II

Provides feedback of most commonly installed
steganography-producing software

Uses

Signature
Detection Software

Produce

Producers of Signature
Detection Software

Figure 6: The Concept of Prioritized Feedback
2.3. Conclusion
The results of the Research Project II demonstrate that evidence pertaining to
the usage of steganography by criminals was found and thus a proof of concept
of the effectiveness of the new, enhanced procedure proposed for finding
steganography was presented. The procedure proposed in Research Project I
failed to provide evidence in favor of the argument that ‘steganography is
being used by criminals’. Thus, the new methodology based on Stego-Usage
Timeline is an improvement over the one proposed in Research Project I and
has been able to answer the research questions presented in figure 1 and figure
2 positively. The research also demonstrates the concept of prioritization of the
steganography-producing software by providing feedback based on the
scanning results for the purpose of designing efficient signature detection
algorithms. The following figure summarizes the contribution of the entire
research effort.
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Key Outcomes of Research Project I
• Over 1 million Web sites crawled for images
• Images scanned for steganographic signatures and no steganography found
• Concepts of Stego-Usage Timeline and Prioritization proposed
• Research methodology redefined based on Stego-Usage Timeline with a focus on file
Key Outcomes of Research Project II
• Over 96 crime-related seized drives scanned for steganographic artifacts
• False positive analysis carried out with help of the NSRL database
• Proof of Concept demonstrated for the host file artifact-based detection methodology
• Concept of Prioritization demonstrated

Figure 7: Key Outcomes of Research Projects
2.4. Further Research

Although the research was able to present a proof of concept of the
proposed Stego-Usage Timeline methodology, the evidence observed
was limited and is not statistically significant to analyze the trends the
observed in steganography-producing applications and criminal
backgrounds associated with it. This can be due to several possible
reasons:


The sample size (number of cases scanned=96) was too small



Criminals used steganography; however the file artifacts could not be
traced down as being steganographic in nature when they were
common to many applications (i.e. they fell under NF and ID
categories)



Criminals used steganography; however the file artifact detection
software was unaware of the applications used by the criminals to
generate steganography and hence was unable to associate the
corresponding artifacts to steganography

Thus, further research is being focused towards obtaining more positives
by increasing the sample set in order to overcome the first limitation
mentioned above. The proof of concept has demonstrated that
steganography is being used but further research will help in answering
the question ‘to what extent steganography is being used’.
Also, a model of a multi-phased approach towards steganography
detection is being formulated where the usage of both techniques; viz.
artifact detection and signature detection is suggested for the detection
of steganography. A more prioritized and focused direction which deals
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with the artifact detection first and then proceeds to the signature
detection with algorithms incorporating the prioritization feedback is
proposed. This approach has the potential to be an efficient mechanism
in terms of time and effort by overcoming the limitations faced by either
of the research projects when carried out independently.
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